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The PLoS Medicine Debate
B
ackground to the debate: Systematic reviews that 
combine high-quality evidence from several trials are 
now widely considered to be at the top of the hierarchy of 
clinical evidence. Given the primacy of systematic reviews—
and the fact that individual clinical trials rarely provide 
definitive answers to a clinical research question—some 
commentators question whether the sample size calculation 
for an individual trial still matters. Others point out that 
small trials can still be potentially misleading.
Gordon Guyatt and Edward Mills’ Viewpoint: 
It Is a Delusion to Think That Sample Size 
Calculations of Individual Trials Matter
Funding agencies, ethics review boards, journals, and 
investigators are often preoccupied with power calculations 
and sample sizes required in clinical trials. We argue that the 
current practice of sample size justification for randomized 
clinical trials (RCTs) represents a willing self-deception. 
Recognizing and adjusting to current realities of RCT 
conduct may be necessary.
In the high-income nations where most RCTs are 
organized and funded, chronic diseases are responsible 
for most morbidity and mortality. In these conditions, 
multiple pathogenic and behavioral mechanisms determine 
outcome. Thus, we can anticipate only small to moderate 
treatment effects from therapies that address only one or 
two mechanisms. Furthermore, events often occur over a 
prolonged period of time. 
Investigators organizing clinical trials therefore face 
daunting obstacles. Providing definitive answers in the 
face of low event rates and small-to-moderate treatment 
effects necessitates sample sizes in the thousands or tens of 
thousands. Organizing trials that will enroll such samples 
involves enormous challenges, as does monitoring the quality 
of enrollment and data collection once the trials begin. 
Funding for such mega-trials is very limited, and is often 
restricted to industry sources.
Even very large trials often produce results that are far from 
definitive. For instance, the CAPRIE trial (Clopidogrel versus 
Aspirin in Patients at Risk of Ischemic Events) addressed 
the relative merits of these two drugs in over 19,000 patients 
with atherosclerotic vascular disease. The confidence interval 
around the statistically significant reduction in vascular events 
with clopidogrel included a lower boundary (0.3% relative 
risk reduction) that would preclude administration of this 
expensive drug [1]. Furthermore, the results of even very 
large trials may prove discrepant with one another [2].
Thus, it is seldom that single trials, even very large ones, 
provide definitive answers. The scientific community has 
appropriately accepted that only systematic reviews and meta-
analyses combining high-quality evidence from many RCTs 
will yield robust answers. Individual trials are best viewed 
as providing important information that contributes to the 
larger body of evidence.
The clinical trial community responds to these problems 
with a variety of understandable, pragmatic strategies that 
nevertheless involve a degree of denial. Investigators typically 
decide how many patients they can feasibly enroll and then 
find ways of making assumptions that will justify embarking 
on a trial with a feasible sample size. These assumptions 
typically involve choosing a level of delta (the threshold 
effect below which they are ready to accept a false negative 
result) that exceeds the minimum effect many patients would 
consider important.
Other popular strategies are even more problematic. 
Investigators choose composite endpoints that include 
a wide range of components that would be important to 
patients, creating a high risk of misleading interpretation [3]. 
Investigators focus on outcomes that are more frequent, but 
less important: for instance, in patients with diabetes, crossing 
a threshold of serum glucose, or earlier need for a second 
medication, rather than complications of illness such as major 
vascular events, neuropathy, or visual impairment.
Perhaps an even more damaging consequence of the 
unrealistic insistence that individual trials be powered to 
produce definitive results is that RCTs that would contribute 
to the body of knowledge are never undertaken. It is 
unclear how many potential trialists abandon conduct of 
a trial when they confront its sample size implications, or 
when they face demands from funding agencies and review 
committees regarding the sample size they must generate. 
Our experience in the world of clinical investigation 
suggests, however, that a large number of potential trials get 
abandoned. The result is that questions that could ultimately 
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be resolved by a systematic review and meta-analysis remain 
unanswered, or inadequately answered [4]. 
How can we resolve this dilemma? Peer-reviewed granting 
agencies should cease to ask the question “Is this trial 
powered to definitively answer its primary question?” Rather, 
they should ask a series of more appropriate alternative 
questions. First, how important is the issue the investigators 
propose to address? Are other groups throughout the world 
investigating the same, or similar questions? How much trial 
funding is the agency willing to provide? Within the limits 
of what the agency is willing to fund, have the investigators 
gone to appropriate lengths to include collaboration that will 
maximize the number of patients they will be able to enroll? 
One could question whether it is ethical to enroll patients 
in a trial that makes no pretense of definitively answering a 
question. Indeed, some have asserted that underpowered 
trials are unethical [5]. But is it not ethical to contribute to 
a body of knowledge that will ultimately lead to a definitive 
answer? Is it not unethical to tell patients that a trial will be 
definitive when that is very unlikely? Is it not more ethical to 
provide patients with a realistic notion of the contribution of 
the trial in which they may participate: that it will be one of a 
number of such studies that will ultimately resolve the issue?
What will result from the conceptual shift we propose? 
First, agencies and investigators will undertake more RCTs, 
and evidence for important questions will accumulate more 
quickly. Second, investigators will be less tempted to stretch 
their resources and capacities for quality control, and validity 
of RCTs will improve. Third, when we abandon the current 
delusion that sample size matters, our minds will open to 
new strategies for efficiently obtaining crucial evidence for 
important health issues.
Diana Elbourne’s Viewpoint: Trials That Are Too 
Small Are Potentially Misleading
When I first started working with clinicians on randomised 
trials a quarter of a century ago, the most important point 
I felt I needed to stress was the centrality of randomisation 
(and allocation concealment) for reducing the very real risks 
of selection bias at trial entry. Only once that idea was firmly 
embedded would I consider the many other aspects of trials 
to which I, as a methodologist, felt I might have something 
to contribute—such as post-randomisation selection biases, 
assessment biases, and, of course, sample size. While I would 
still consider randomisation and allocation concealment the 
most important issue, sample size doesn’t come far behind.
As a statistician, I am often asked, “What size should a trial 
be? Is 100 patients going to be enough? Or 10? Or 1,000?” Of 
course, I have to say that there is no absolute number. The 
considerations may be different if the researcher is thinking 
about costs, ethics, or about statistical power. Here I will 
concentrate mainly on the statistical issues. 
There may be only one chance (the so-called “window 
of opportunity”) to conduct a trial, so it needs to be large 
enough to be able to address the question that is being asked. 
If one postulates a size of effect that is both likely to be able 
to influence clinical practice and is feasible, then one wants 
to have a sample size that is large (powerful) enough to be 
able to detect that effect with reasonable confidence, allowing 
for acceptable errors. The corresponding power calculations 
are simple but the assumptions on which they are based may 
be problematic. The acceptable errors are traditionally set at 
5% (or 1%) for a type 1 error, and 20% (or 10%) for a type 
2 error. There is nothing magic about these levels other than 
that they are generally seen as acceptable risks to run. 
Much more problematic are decisions about the effect size. 
There is always a trade-off between a very large effect that 
would almost certainly change clinical practice and a more 
realistic estimate based on emerging empirical evidence 
(preferably from a systematic review or a pilot study) about 
the likelihood of a particular effect size. Similarly, effect 
sizes (at least for categorical variables) take into account the 
incidence of the primary outcome in the control group. It is 
a common experience in trials to find that an outcome is less 
common than estimated, with potential implications for the 
statistical power. 
Power calculations are clearly an inexact science. However, 
the fact that a process is difficult does not mean we should 
abandon it—if the notion of an appropriate sample size 
is useful. The main reason I would still wish trialists and 
funders to take notice of statistical power is that trials that 
are too small are potentially misleading. On the one hand 
they may miss realistic, moderate treatment effects that 
would be clinically important [6], and a potentially useful 
intervention may therefore be dismissed. This is particularly 
worrying if it means that no further trials are carried out 
because the treatment doesn’t look as if it’s going to be 
clinically or commercially valuable. On the other hand, if an 
underpowered trial does find a statistically significant effect, 
this is most likely to be a chance finding that over-estimates 
the size of effect [7]. This occurrence may also stifle further 
trials as many will feel that it is unethical to randomise if 
a treatment looks effective (at least in terms of statistical 
significance). 
No trial should stand alone. Before a new trial is considered, 
the existing evidence from systematic reviews (with statistical 
meta-analysis if appropriate) should be used to inform a 
decision on whether the new trial is necessary. If it is, then 
the existing evidence should also be used to help shape the 
design of the trial, including the sample size. Similarly, once 
an individual trial is completed, the results should be used to 
update the systematic review to inform practice and further 
research. 
But systematic reviews cannot take the place of trials. 
Systematic reviews must be populated by the trials. If, 
however, the results of a small trial stifle further trials being 
carried out, then the main strength of a meta-analysis (which 
is to increase the precision of the estimate of effect) will not 
be realised. And this is even without considering the issue of 
publication bias from small trials [8]. 
Small trials are often (but not invariably) conducted in a 
single centre. This limits the generalisability of the results to 
different populations. Again, this is not problematic if there 
is a systematic review populated by several trials with a range 
of populations from different settings. But what if a small trial 
stifles these various trials being conducted?
Finally, I would like to return to the ethics of conducting 
trials. We are asking prospective trial participants to volunteer 
to help in an important collaborative venture. We should not 
be asking them to volunteer if the trial is not likely to provide 
an answer to the question or may even be misleading [9]. 
Nevertheless, we would be doing even worse to ask them to PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0005 January 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 1  |  e4
take part in a large study aiming to assess effectiveness that 
was not securely randomised. Size may be important, but bias 
is worse than imprecision.
Gordon Guyatt and Edward Mills’ Response
Professor Elbourne makes excellent points. Minimizing 
bias in clinical trials should be paramount. Systematic reviews 
should inform clinical trials. Investigators should conduct the 
largest multicenter trials that feasibility permits.
Professor Elbourne is concerned that small trials may 
mislead. She is correct, particularly if the trial results are 
substantially biased upward because of poor design or 
because they stop early for apparent benefit [10]. The latter 
is a particular problem, because such trials tend to receive 
undue attention [11]. 
The problem of misleading small trials is, however, 
correctable. It is possible to educate the clinical community. 
Trial design is far better than it was a decade ago. Those 
designing trials are awaking to the dangers of stopping 
early for apparent benefit, and clinicians are realizing that 
systematic reviews of all the high-quality evidence available 
must guide decision making. Systematic reviews go a long 
way to ameliorating the misleading inferences that Professor 
Elbourne fears. 
Professor Elbourne is concerned that small trials will 
stifle investigation. It is an empirical question whether her 
concerns or ours are more important in discouraging clinical 
trial conduct. We have experienced few instances when small 
trial results seriously discouraged investigation, and the 
strategies we have suggested can deal with those situations. 
We have, however, experienced dozens of instances in 
which investigators are caught between the Scylla of power 
calculations that demand extravagant sample sizes, and the 
Charybdis of grant committees unwilling to commit the 
resources required to achieve these sample sizes. 
Demanding adequate power to allow a single trial to 
definitively settle an issue is naïve. Furthermore, stifling of 
clinical trials by a paradigm that accepts this naïve approach 
is a present, immediate, and dire threat to accumulating 
adequate clinical trial evidence to settle important questions. 
Addressing this problem necessitates the change in the 
principles underlying funding of clinical trials that we suggest. 
Diana Elbourne’s Response
Readers who are looking for a clash between two 
diametrically opposed views may be disappointed in this 
exchange—we agree on so much.
We agree on the centrality of minimising bias, and of 
systematic reviews. We are also optimists (both by nature and 
with some supportive evidence) and think that there have 
been improvements in the design, conduct, and reporting of 
trials, as well as in some aspects of the climate in which they 
operate—notably the greater acceptance, volume, and quality 
of systematic reviews, and also the increase in trial registration. 
We agree that there is a concern that small trials may 
mislead and may stifle investigation. The extent of the effect 
is surely a topic for empirical research when sufficient time in 
the new trials climate has elapsed. 
And we agree investigators should conduct the largest 
multi-centre trials that feasibility permits. Perhaps, therefore, 
our main differences are about the feasibility of getting those 
large trials funded. A recent qualitative study concluded that: 
“[A] range of skills and a degree of agility are required for 
negotiations with potential funders and collaborators…It 
may also be desirable for [public sector] funding bodies to 
demonstrate reciprocal skills and flexibility in assessing the 
financial plans of research applicants.” [12]
As it may be more cost-effective to reap the benefits of scale 
by conducting a small number of large trials rather than a 
large number of smaller trials, this agility may include such 
strategies as providing relatively more funding for pilot and 
feasibility phases to demonstrate that particular suitably large 
trials can be conducted, with safeguards for the funding 
bodies to be able to withdraw support for those trials which 
are not succeeding.
As an optimist, I believe it is possible to educate not only 
the clinical community but also the funding bodies so that, 
as far as possible, researchers, clinicians, and funders can 
work together with other stakeholders (especially patients) to 
ensure that suitable trials get funded and produce results that 
are capable of moving forward the care that patients and their 
families can receive.
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